There is some interesting stuff in there. This is the type of thing I would have liked to see get more ink while it was happening rather than two years later though.
Pendry was playing the politics games so hard so that he could be offensive coordinator that:
a) He messed up the o-line - don't play the best players, play non-Casserly players.
b) He in turn messed up the offense - Palmer's offense is too hard, try my ultraconservative approach.
The Texans are paying for these self-aggrandizing games to this day weak line, stunted offense.
This seems like a great time to remind everyone of something: In 2004, the Texans finished 7-9. They were one of six teams with a 3,500-yard passer, a 1,000-yard rusher (Domanick Davis) and a 1,000-yard receiver (Andre Johnson). Then, the braintrust made Palmer change the offense because they panicked when Carr was sacked six times and hit a lot more in that season-ending loss to Cleveland.
Palmer didn't want to change the offense. He wanted to improve the protection by adding better linemen. But he was forced to change it to try to protect Carr, so they went to a quick drop and quick release rather than let Carr take a deeper drop and wait for his receivers to get open down the field. It backfired because Palmer hadn't coached that system, and Carr hadn't played in it.
Have you ever wondered what would have happened if the offensive system had been left alone, and the Texans had devoted more energy into improving the protection in 2005? I know it's hindsight, but I bet they wouldn't have finished 2-14, and Dom Capers wouldn't have lost his job.
Pendry was playing the politics games so hard so that he could be offensive coordinator that:
a) He messed up the o-line - don't play the best players, play non-Casserly players.
b) He in turn messed up the offense - Palmer's offense is too hard, try my ultraconservative approach.
The Texans are paying for these self-aggrandizing games to this day weak line, stunted offense.